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additionally that they anticipated future 
advertisements in compliance with the 
guidelines established by the Supreme 
Court. The announcement was published 
subsequent to the receipt of the Grievance 
Commission's letter. 
The next move belongs to the Grie-
vance Commission; but movement and 
comment have not been forthcoming. 
Stagnation is obviously not tolerated at 
LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND, 
P.A. any more than is intimidation. On 
July 28 ad "B" appeared in The Evening 
Capital. 
The jury is still out on this noteworthy 
episode, but the verdict, no matter how 
slow in coming, seems certain; lawyer ad-
vertising has arrived. 
Medicaid 
Funds 
Aborted 
by Janis A. Riker 
As a result of two decisions by the 
Supreme Court permitting States to 
refuse to pay for non therapeutic abortions 
with Medicaid funds, A Brooklyn Federal 
District Court judge opened the doors for 
Congressional action to prohibit Medicaid 
payments for all abortions except those 
cases where the life of the mother would 
be in danger if the pregnancy were carried 
to term. 
In Beal v. Doe, 97 S.Ct. 236, (June 20, 
1977), and Maher v. Roe, 97 S.Ct. 2366, 
(June 20, 1977), the Supreme Court held 
that neither Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act nor the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires states partiCipating in the Medicaid 
program to spend Medicaid funds for non-
therapeutic abortions. 
Following these decisions regarding 
state action, the Supreme Court ordered 
the District Court judge to reconsider his 
previous injunction prohibiting enforce-
ment of the Hyde Amendment, which 
limits federal Medicaid funds for abortions 
to those in which the life of the mother is 
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in danger (Department of Labor and 
Health, Education and Welfare Ap-
propriation Act, 1977, sec. 209, Pub. L. 
No. 94-439 (1976)). As a result the in-
junction was withdrawn. The Hyde 
Amendment remained in effect only until 
September 30, 1977, but Congress is 
deadlocked in considering a continuation 
of its restrictions on abortion funding. 
Further Congressional action to limit 
federal payments for abortions would be 
necessary if Congress wants to prohibit 
states from using Medicaid funds. The 
Court held in Beal that Pennsylvania's 
refusal to provide Medicaid coverage for 
non therapeutic abortions is not inconsis-
tent with Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act, but that the statute does permit a 
state to provide such coverage if it so 
desires. The Hyde Amendment prohibited 
such coverage, however, for the current 
fiscal year. 
The 6-3 Beal decision (Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall and Blackmun dissenting) is 
based on the Court's interpretation of the 
language of the statute itself, the intent of 
Congress and the federal agency in-
terpretation of the statute. 
Quoting the statute's specific language, 
the Court concludes that the act confers 
broad discretion upon states to adopt 
standards for determining the extent of 
medical assistance provided. 
Noting that nontherapeutic abortions 
were unlawful in most states when Con-
gress passed Title XIX in 1965, Justice 
Powell said in the opinion that it was not 
likely that it was the intent of Congress to 
require states to fund nontherapeutic 
abortions. 
Furthermore, unless there are compell-
ing indications that the agency interpreta-
tion of the statute is erroneous, the Court 
will follow its construction, and the 
Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare concluded that Title XIX permits, 
but does not require, funding of non-
therapeutic abortions. 
In its companion Maher deCision, the 
Court held that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution does not re-
quire a state partiCipating in Medicaid to 
pay for nontherapeutic abortions even 
though it pays for childbirth. It is this 
holding which provides the basis for 
federal legislation restricting abortion 
coverage by Medicaid funds. 
A regulation of the Connecticut 
Welfare Department limiting state 
Medicaid benefits for first trimester abor-
tions to those that are "medically necess-
ary" (a term defined to include psychiatric 
necessity) was challenged by two indigent 
women who were unable to obtain physi-
cians' certificates of medical necessity. 
A three-judge District Court panel en-
joined the state from requiring a certifi-
cate of medical necessity for Medicaid-
funded abortions, holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause requires a state to fund 
nontherapeutic abortions if it generally 
provides for funds for medical expenses 
related to pregnancy and childbirth. 
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding 
neither discrimination against a suspect 
class nor interference with a fundamental 
right protected by the Constitution. 
In its "strict scrutiny" analysis, the 
Court said that it has never held that fi-
nancial need alone creates a suspect class 
for equal protection purposes. 
Most importantly, the Court stated that 
the fundamental Constitutional right pro-
tected in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) was a woman's freedom to decide 
to terminate her pregnancy, not an un-
qualified right to the abortion itself. Roe 
prohibits undue state interference with a 
woman's decision to have an abortion, but 
it does not impose an affirmative obliga-
tion on states to make abortions available. 
Justice Brennan in his Maher dissent 
argues that the Connecticut statute in-
fringes on the woman's constitutionally 
protected right of privacy by placing fi-
nancial presssures on indigent women to 
carry their pregnancies to term. However, 
the six-justice majority concluded that 
Roe did not limit a state's authority to use 
public funds to encourage its own values, 
such as favoring childbirth over abortion. 
The Court said that the Connecticut 
regulation: 
" ... places no obstacles-absolute or 
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's 
path to an abortion. An indigent 
woman who desires an abortion 
sufferes no disadvantage as a conse-
quence of Connecticut's decision to 
fund childbirth; she continues as before 
to be dependent on private sources 
. . .. The State may have made 
childbirth a more attractice alternative, 
thereby influencing the woman's deci-
sion, but it has imposed no restriction 
on access to abortions that was not 
already there." 97 S.Ct. 2382-2383. 
Connecticut's regulation can be sus-
tained under the "rational basis" test that 
applies in the absence of a suspect 
classification or the interference with a 
fundamental right; i.e. whether the legis-
lative scheme rationally furthers some 
legitimate, articulated purpose. 
The Court concluded that the Connec-
ticut regulation meets the requirement 
that the distinction between childbirth 
and non therapeutic abortion is rationally 
related to a constitutionally permissable 
state purpose. That according to the 
Court, is the protection of the potential 
life of the fetus by encouraging normal 
childbirth. 
The Court cited Roe v. Wade as recog-
nizing the state's strong interest existing 
throughout the pregnancy, including the 
first trimester. The subsidy of costs rel-
ated to childbirth, which are greater than 
the costs of a first trimester abortion, is a 
rational means of furthering the state's in-
terest. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
471, 475 (1970), the court held that 
classifications survive equal protection 
challenges when a "reasonable basis" for 
the classification is shown, despite a 
recognition that laws and regulations 
allocating welfare funds involve "the most 
basic economic needs of impoverished 
human beings .... " 
Marshall's dissent in Beal actually is a 
challenge to the Court's holding in Maher. 
Marshall calls for a new equal protection 
analysis, which would weigh three factors: 
the importance of the governmental 
benefits denied, the character of the class, 
and the asserted state interests. 
The Court in Maher, however, refuses 
to engage in a weighing and balancing of 
benefits, class characteristics and strength 
of state interests. Rather, the Court stated 
that "[wlhen an issue involves policy 
choices as sensitive as those implicated by 
public funding of non therapeutic abor-
tions, the appropriate forum for their 
resolution in a democracy is the legis-
lature." 97 S.Ct. at 2385-2386. 
Nixon Loses 
Bid To 
Control "The 
Tapes" 
by Charles F. Chester 
In Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services, 97 S.Ct. 2777 (1977), the 
Supreme Court decided by a vote of 7-2 
that it was necessary to prevent a presi-
dent from concealing information of in-
terest to the public simply because the in-
formation would reveal embarrassing yet 
truthful facts about him. By sustaining the 
constitutionality of the Presidential 
Recording and Materials Preservation Act 
(PRMPA) 44 U.s.C. §2107, the Court has 
taken a positive step in the direction of 
curbing the abuse of presidential power. 
The PRMPA was the congressional 
reaction to an agreement between a 
former president, Richard M. Nixon and a 
former General Services Administrator, 
Arthur F. Sampson. They agreed that 
General Services Administration would 
possess the infamous "Nixon Tapes", but 
that Nixon would retain all property rights 
to them. One of these rights was to have 
the tapes detroyed at Nixon's will, upon 
his death, or by September 1, 1984. 
Congress, disturbed by this prospective 
and arbitrary power reserved for Nixon, 
passed legislation to control custody of 42 
million pages of documents and 880 reels 
of tape. The PRMPA provides for a 
screening process by which materials of a 
personal nature would be returned to Nix-
on and those of' historical significance 
would be released to the public. The 
destruction of a President's materials is 
prohibited and specific items necessary 
for judicial proceedings are subject to su-
poena. 
Although a president still had the right 
of access to his materials, Nixon wished to 
retain full control over his presidential 
materials. 
Nixon sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief and enforcement of his agree-
ment with the GSA in the District Court 
for the District of Columbia. The district 
court dismissed his case and the decision 
was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia. 
In response to Nixon's claim that he 
was being unlawfully deprived of con-
stitutionally delegated executive powers, 
the Supreme Court decided that Congress 
did have the authority to pass legislation 
affecting the disposition of presidential 
materials. The opinion acknowledged that 
Nixon retained the full executive control 
to which he was entitled because the 
release of any tapes is subject to "any 
legally or constitutionally based right of 
privilege." In the Court's opinion Con-
gress was not attempting to gain any new 
authority or take away any legitimate 
presidential powers. The legislative intent 
of the PRMPA was held to be the protec-
tion of the public's right to know the truth 
about Watergate and the restoration of 
public confidence in government. 
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